shakira.exe Analysis

This is more or less a part two to the naprava.exe analysis. Turns out the SD card holds many malicious surprises.

Again, this is a 14-year-old malware executable from Moldova that was inadvertently stored on a SD card.

Analysis

shakira.exe loads the following dlls in chronological order:

  • +46ms
    • ntdll.dll
    • kernel32.dll
  • +62 ms
    • KernelBase.dll
    • user32.dll
    • gdi32.dll
    • lpk.dll
    • usp10.dll
    • msvcrt.dll
  • +78 ms
    • C:\Windows\winsxs\x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_5.82.7601.18837_none_ec86b8d6858ec0bc\comctl32.dll
    • advapi32.dll
    • sechost.dll
    • rpcrt4.dll
    • loeaut32.dll
    • ole32.dll
    • shell32.dll
    • shlwapi.dll
    • imm32.dll
    • msctf.dll
  • +203 ms
    • apphelp.dll
  • +218 ms
    • svchost.exe

The executable runs process svchost.exe. The process drops another executable: C:\Users\admin\xuat.exe. Then xuat.exe writes to the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon with the value explorer.exe,C:\Users\admin\xuat.exe and named Shell. The dropper did this in order to keep persistence at restart and logon. The process then reads many various registry entries regarding network connections.

At +906 ms the process creates a connection to 44.221.84[.]105:33111 (slade.safehousenumber[.]com). The process sends 21 bytes of data via UDP protocol:

At +120 seconds, the xuat.exe process creates a connection to 193.166.255[.]171:33111 (portal.roomshowerbord[.]com). The process sends 21 bytes of data via UDP protocol.

At +128 seconds, the Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service Configuration Application (C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe)runs in the background and gathers client information (reads computer name, checks supported languages, and other sysinfo).

At +151 seconds, the xuat.exe process creates a connection to 44.221.84[.]105:33111 (slade.safehousenumber[.]com). The process sends 21 bytes of data via UDP protocol:

The malware seems to gather system information and send it to C2 servers.

Ghidra produced the following decompiled output:

void entry(void)

{
  undefined4 *puVar1;
  undefined4 extraout_ECX;
  uint extraout_EDX;
  byte *pbVar2;
  char **local_74;
  _startupinfo local_70;
  int local_6c;
  char **local_68;
  int local_64;
  _STARTUPINFOA local_60;
  undefined *local_1c;
  void *pvStack_14;
  undefined *puStack_10;
  undefined *puStack_c;
  undefined4 local_8;
  
  puStack_c = &DAT_00412058;
  puStack_10 = &DAT_0041148c;
  pvStack_14 = ExceptionList;
  local_1c = &stack0xffffff6c;
  local_8 = 0;
  ExceptionList = &pvStack_14;
  __set_app_type(2);
  _DAT_00412038 = 0xffffffff;
  _DAT_00412078 = 0xffffffff;
  puVar1 = (undefined4 *)__p__fmode();
  *puVar1 = DAT_0041214c;
  puVar1 = (undefined4 *)__p__commode();
  *puVar1 = DAT_0041206c;
  _DAT_00412070 = *(undefined4 *)_adjust_fdiv_exref;
  FUN_0041147b();
  if (DAT_0041208c == 0) {
    __setusermatherr(&DAT_00412254);
  }
  FUN_0041147b();
  _initterm(&DAT_00412090,&DAT_00412090);
  local_70.newmode = DAT_00412020;
  __getmainargs(&local_64,&local_74,&local_68,DAT_00412080,&local_70);
  _initterm(&DAT_00412090,&DAT_00412090);
  pbVar2 = *(byte **)_acmdln_exref;
  if (*pbVar2 != 0x22) {
    do {
      if (*pbVar2 < 0x21) goto LAB_0041140f;
      pbVar2 = pbVar2 + 1;
    } while( true );
  }
  do {
    pbVar2 = pbVar2 + 1;
    if (*pbVar2 == 0) break;
  } while (*pbVar2 != 0x22);
  if (*pbVar2 != 0x22) goto LAB_0041140f;
  do {
    pbVar2 = pbVar2 + 1;
LAB_0041140f:
  } while ((*pbVar2 != 0) && (*pbVar2 < 0x21));
  local_60.dwFlags = 0;
  GetStartupInfoA(&local_60);
  GetModuleHandleA((LPCSTR)0x0);
  local_6c = FUN_004109ec(extraout_ECX,extraout_EDX);
                    /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
  exit(local_6c);

OSINT

shakira.exe
a94ccc4af328865384badd276d1f1a4bb38fa83edc006ad275b1f767eaf17c53
53/64, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a94ccc4af328865384badd276d1f1a4bb38fa83edc006ad275b1f767eaf17c53
Associated with the Armadillo malware packer.

xuat.exe
a94ccc4af328865384badd276d1f1a4bb38fa83edc006ad275b1f767eaf17c53
Same as/Part of above file.

slade.safehousenumber[.]com
9/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/slade.safehousenumber.com
GoDaddy registered domain known for phishing.

murik.portal-protection.net[.]ru
3/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/murik.portal-protection.net.ru
Domain registered with Russian registrar RU-CENTER-RU. Known malware domain.

banana.cocolands[.]su
5/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/banana.cocolands.su
Registered with NIC.ru domain registrar. Known malware domain.

portal.roomshowerbord[.]com
5/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/portal.roomshowerbord.com
Domain registered with GoDaddy. Known malware domain.

44.221.84[.]105
1/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/44.221.84.105/details
Supposedly an Amazon domestic IP. But associated with malware.

193.166.255[.]171
2/94, https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.166.255.171
Finnish IP serving phishing domains.

Conclusion

Definitely similar to naprava.exe. Maybe the same threat actor wrote this malware where I contracted it in the Chisinau, Moldova internet cafe.

Indicators of Compromise

AnyRun Linkhttps://app.any.run/tasks/abdd8821-c4aa-4f97-9d86-4eb5f1983023
File Path..\havesit\shakira.exe
File Nameshakira.exe
SHA256a94ccc4af328865384badd276d1f1a4bb38fa83edc006ad275b1f767eaf17c53
C2 Domainslade.safehousenumber[.]com
C2 Domainmurik.portal-protection.net[.]ru
C2 Domainbanana.cocolands[.]su
C2 Domainportal.roomshowerbord[.]com
C2 IP44.221.84[.]105
C2 IP193.166.255[.]171